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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-ExCLUSIONARY RULE-No GOOD
FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE ARKANSAS RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE-YET. State v. Anderson, 286 Ark. 58, 688 S.W.2d 947 (1985).
Officer Jerry Ridgell of the Stuttgart Police Department observed
Charles Ray Anderson, Jr., making a drug sale on the afternoon of
April 12, 1983. At 2:00 the next morning, Officer Ridgell appeared
before the circuit judge to request a warrant to search Anderson's
house. Officer Ridgell offered no affidavit to support issuance of the
warrant, but instead offered oral testimony. His oral testimony was not
recorded.
The circuit judge issued a warrant for the search of Anderson's
house. At 2:30, Anderson was arrested and his house and vehicle
searched. The police found marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Ander-
son was charged with several crimes, but all the charges were later
dismissed except for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.'
At trial, Anderson moved to suppress the evidence seized in the
search of his house and vehicle. His motion was granted as to the
search of his vehicle, but denied as to the search of his house. Anderson
was found guilty of possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor, and sen-
tenced to one year in jail and fined $1,000.2 Anderson appealed to the
Arkansas Court of Appeals, arguing that the drug paraphernalia
should not have been admitted over an objection to its relevance and
that the search warrant was improperly and illegally authorized. The
court of appeals upheld the trial court on the issue of the admissibility
of the paraphernalia but reversed on the issue of the validity of the
search warrant.3
After Anderson and the state had submitted their briefs to the
court of appeals, but before the court rendered a decision, the United
States Supreme Court decided United States v. Leon4 and Massachu-
setts v. Sheppard,' which held that evidence seized under a defective
search warrant should not be suppressed at trial if the police acted in
good faith in procuring and executing the warrant. Neither party in
Anderson had raised the issue of the officer's good faith.'
I. Anderson v. State, 13 Ark. App. 68, 69, 679 S.W.2d 806, 807 (1984).
2. Id.
3. id.
4. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
5. 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
6. Anderson v. State, 13 Ark. App. at 71, 679 S.W.2d at 808 (Cracraft, C. J., concurring).
UALR LAW JOURNAL
The Arkansas Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari for the
purposes of reconciling Arkansas law with Leon and Sheppard and re-
viewing the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.7 After hearing oral
arguments, which by that time addressed the good faith issue, the su-
preme court held that the search warrant did not comply with the Ar-
kansas Rules of Criminal Procedure and was thus invalid. Therefore,
the resulting search was unreasonable and the evidence seized through
execution of the invalid warrant should not have been admitted at trial.
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not relieve the
police of the burden of compliance with the Arkansas Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure. State v. Anderson, 286 Ark. 58, 688 S.W.2d 947
(1985).
Article IV of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth
the permissible limits of searches and seizures and governs the admissi-
bility of seized evidence at criminal trials. Its roots lie in the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution; Article II, section 15 of
the Arkansas Constitution; and judicial holdings interpreting and ap-
plying those provisions. 8 Article IV can be better understood if its un-
derlying principles are understood. What follows is a look at the ways
two of those principles have been expressed. The two principles are:
First, that evidence seized in an unreasonable search should be ex-
cluded from criminal trials; second, that warrantless searches are pre-
sumed unreasonable, with a few specific exceptions. The court applied
both these principles to reach its decision in Anderson.
The British colonists in North America had many complaints
about their treatment by the Crown before the American Revolution.
The source of some of those complaints was the use by colonial authori-
ties of writs of assistance, which were general warrants giving officials
broad powers to search persons, households, and effects. These abuses
led to the adoption of the fourth amendment after the colonists gained
independence from England.9
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
7. State v. Anderson, 284 Ark. 509, 683 S.W.2d 897 (1985).
8. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. commentary to article IV. Each rule in the Article is discussed with
references to the constitutional provision and/or landmark court decision from which the rule was
generated.
9. See A. CORNELIUs, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 12-15 (1926); see also Note, The
Totality of the Circumstances Test for Determination of Probable Cause is Adopted, 7 U.A.L.R.
L.J. 645, 646 giving a more detailed history of general warrants and their abuses.
514 [Vol. 8:513
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 10
The Arkansas Constitution contains the same provision in virtually
identical language."
Early cases dealt with a problem that still perplexes the courts:
What should be done with evidence seized in an improper search? In
Boyd v. United States,12 the United States Supreme Court held that a
federal customs statute was unconstitutional because it required one
charged with its violation to produce incriminating papers. The Court
held that this requirement violated the provisions of the fourth and fifth
amendments. It violated the fifth amendment prohibition of compelled
self-incrimination, and it violated the fourth amendment because com-
pulsory production of private papers was equivalent to an impermissible
search and seizure.' s In addition, the Court held that the trial court's
admission of the resulting evidence was unconstitutional.' The Court
offered no additional rationale for exclusion of the evidence; exclusion
may have rested on fifth amendment principles rather than on the
fourth amendment.' 5
In 1914, the Court held in Weeks v. United States,6 that a federal
district court erred by admitting into evidence lottery tickets seized by
local police officers and a federal marshal in an unreasonable search."
In the words of Justice Day, writing for a unanimous Court, exclusion
of the evidence was justified because "[tihe efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they
are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles estab-
lished by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land." 8 The federal govern-
ment and its agencies were thus denied use of evidence seized in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment. However, Weeks left open the question
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 15 includes language limiting its protection to people of this state;
otherwise, it is identical to the fourth amendment.
12. 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
13. Id. at 622.
14. Id. at 638.
15. Since the fifth amendment is specifically concerned with coerced evidence and the Court
based its holding on both amendments, further fourth amendment analysis was unnecessary.
16. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
17. Id. at 398-99.
18. Id. at 393.
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of whether the fourth amendment applied to state agencies. 19
In 1949, in Wolf v. Colorado,20 the Court was asked to extend the
protection of the Weeks exclusionary rule to persons convicted in state
courts of state offenses when evidence used in their trials would have
been excluded in federal courts. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the
Court, refused to incorporate the fourth amendment into the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Frankfurter agreed
that the fourteenth amendment offered protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures, but not because it extended fourth amendment
prohibitions to the states. Instead, the fourteenth amendment offered
protection to one's right of privacy, a right "implicit in 'the concept of
ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the
Due Process clause.
21
Justice Frankfurter went further, saying that the exclusionary rule
applied in Weeks was not derived from the explicit requirements of the
fourth amendment, but was a matter of judicial implication. It was
only one of several means of enforcing the right to privacy. Other
means might be more appropriate in state jurisdictions. 22 Therefore,
the Court refused to apply the Weeks doctrine to state actions when
equally effective state remedies existed.2"
Justice Murphy dissented in Wolf, arguing that judicial exclusion
of evidence was the only effective alternative available to deter viola-
tion of the search and seizure clause. It seemed unlikely to Justice
Murphy that a district attorney would bring criminal charges against
himself or his associates for well-meaning violations of the search and
seizure clause of the fourth amendment. Civil remedies were illusory,
since recoverable damages were likely to be minimal.
2 '
At the time of the Weeks decision, and until at least 1959, Arkan-
sas courts refused to consider the legality of a search as a factor in
determining the admissibility of evidence. In 1896, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court held in Starchman v. State" that evidence was admissible
in a criminal prosecution even if it was illegally obtained. Later cases
19. Id. at 398-99.
20. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
21. Id. at 27, 28 (quoting in part Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
22. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 28-33.
23. Id. Since Wolf left the states beyond the reach of the exclusionary rule, federal courts
remained open to improperly seized evidence until 1960. They admitted evidence seized by state
agents, if unassisted by federal agents, until Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
24. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 42, 43 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
25. 62 Ark. 538, 36 S.W. 940 (1896).
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followed the rule with little discussion.26
In Clubb v. State,2 7 the Arkansas Supreme Court warned that it
would consider applying an exclusionary rule similar to the federal rule
in future cases. Clubb, however, was not a proper case for application
of an exclusionary rule, since no proof was offered that evidence was
improperly seized.2"
The United States Supreme Court acted before the Arkansas Su-
preme Court had any further opportunity to create its own exclusionary
rule. Two years after Clubb, in Mapp v. Ohio,29 the Court overruled
Wolf v. Colorado and held that evidence seized during an unreasonable
search was inadmissible in a state court.30 Justice Clark announced
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the
fourth amendment together "assure[d] . . . that no man is to be con-
victed on unconstitutional evidence."'" Thus, "all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a state court."32
In both Wolf and Mapp, the pivotal issue was whether the exclu-
sionary rule rested on a constitutional foundation. If the rule rested
upon either the fourth, fifth, or fourteenth amendment, or various com-
binations of them, then the rule followed the rights granted by those
amendments to all judicial forums, including state courts. If, instead,
the rule was merely a judicially created rule of evidence based on re-
medial theories or considerations of judicial integrity,33 then the rule
applied only to federal courts through the Supreme Court's inherent
supervisory power.3 4 For the rule to be mandatory in state courts, it
must have a constitutional foundation, since federal courts have no su-
pervisory power over state courts. Thus, it was essential to the holding
in Mapp that the rule have constitutional origins.
Arkansas applied the exclusionary rule beginning with Ward v.
26. See, e.g., Woolem v. State, 179 Ark. 1119, 20 S.W.2d 185 (1929) (following
Starchman); Van Hook v. City of Helena, 170 Ark. 1083, 282 S.W. 673 (1926) (implying that
violation of article II, section 15 of the Arkansas Constitution could result in the exclusion of any
evidence seized thereby); Benson v. State, 149 Ark. 633, 233 S.W. 758 (1921) (the legality of a
search was not a factor to be considered in excluding evidence).
27. 230 Ark. 688, 326 S.W.2d 816 (1959).
28. Id.
29. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
30. Id. at 653.
31. Id. at 657.
32. Id. at 655.
33. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
34. Id. at 206.
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State 5 in 1967. Later decisions generally followed the governing fed-
eral holdings. 6
In 1975, the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the current Arkan-
sas Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective January 1, 1976). Article
IV of those rules in effect codified federal and state court holdings on
search and seizure up until that date.37 Article IV governs the issuance,
content, and execution of warrants; lists and describes exceptional cir-
cumstances in which warrants are not required; requires that evidence
seized in substantial violation of its provisions be suppressed; and pro-
vides guidelines for trial courts in disposing of motions to suppress. Ar-
ticle IV seems to recognize both a constitutional basis and a deterrence
rationale for its exclusionary provisions. Rule 16.2(e) provides that "[a]
motion to suppress evidence shall be granted only if the court finds that
the violation upon which it is based was substantial, or if otherwise
required by the Constitution of the United States or of this state." 8
However, Rule 16.2(e) also provides: "In determining whether a viola-
tion is substantial the court shall consider all the circumstances, includ-
ing: . . . (v) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent viola-
tions of these rules . .. ,3.
Article IV also impliedly adopted the federal rule that a warrant-
less search is presumptively unreasonable, absent exceptional circum-
stances. 0 Comment I to Rule 16.2 provides grounds for suppression of
evidence if the warrant under which it was seized is determined to be
invalid., 1 However, if the warrant is determined to be invalid, the evi-
dence may still be admitted if the search was authorized under an ex-
ception, such as a search incident to arrest."2 No specific exception is
provided, understandably, for a search made by a police officer who
executes a defective warrant with an objective good faith belief that it
is valid.
The foundation of the exclusionary rule was again the pivotal issue
in the development of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
35. 243 Ark. 472, 420 S.W.2d 540 (1967).
36. See, e.g., Gibbs v. State, 255 Ark. 997, 504 S.W.2d 719 (1974) (seizure of obscene mate-
rial); Cox v. State, 254 Ark. 1, 491 S.W.2d 802, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 923 (1973) (plain view
doctrine).
37. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. commentary to article IV.
38. ARK. R. CRiM. P. 16.2(e).
39. Id.
40. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30
(1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).




in Leon and Sheppard. The Mapp decision had by no means settled the
issue,' but seeds of the Leon and Sheppard holdings could be found in
prior Supreme Court opinions44 in which the Court expressed the view
that the rule was primarily a court-created rule of evidence aimed at
discouraging violation of the fourth amendment by police officers."'
Therefore, before requiring exclusion of evidence, the Court would bal-
ance the costs of applying the rule against any likelihood of deterring
police misconduct. 4" Dissenting Justices argued that the right to have
illegally seized evidence excluded was part and parcel of a defendant's
fourth amendment rights, and thus was personal in nature, not to be
limited for the sake of convenience.47
Justice White first broached the possibility of a good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule in his concurring opinion in Illinois v.
Gates.48 He argued that, if the primary justification for the exclusion-
ary rule was to deter police misconduct, the rule should not be applied
when it would have no deterrent value. For example, if a police officer
executed a technically deficient warrant with an objective good faith
belief that the warrant was valid, Justice White reasoned that no pur-
pose would be served by excluding evidence obtained during a search
under the defective warrant.' "
Justice White wrote for the majority in United States v. Leon"0
and Massachusetts v. Sheppard.51 In Leon, the Court held that evi-
dence seized pursuant to a search warrant unsupported by probable
cause should have been admitted at trial in federal court. Justice White
noted that the question of the sufficiency of the affidavit supporting the
warrant was a close one, and that the officer applying for and executing
the warrant held an objectively reasonable belief that the warrant was
valid."2 He noted that indiscriminate application of the exclusionary
rule would impede the truth-finding function of the courts, allowing
43. An interesting question raised by the Leon decision is whether the Mapp holding itself is
threatened. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 537-38 (1976) (White, J., dissenting), in which
Justice White expressed doubt that he could have voted with the majority in Mapp.
44. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531
(1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
45. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 484.
46. Id. at 487.
47. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 262.
50. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
51. 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
52. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3423.
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some guilty defendants to go free, and would foster disrespect for the
law.53 Balancing the costs of exclusion against the likelihood that exclu-
sion would deter police misconduct in future similar circumstances,
Justice White found that the costs outweighed the benefits.
5 4
In Sheppard, the Court held that evidence seized pursuant to a
search warrant which did not name the items to be seized with particu-
larity should have been admitted at trial in state court. The officer had
sought and received assurances from the magistrate that the warrant
covered the items listed in his affidavit, when in fact it did not. The
supporting affidavit was not incorporated into the warrant, but the of-
ficer restricted his search to the items listed in the affidavit. Again, the
officer executing the warrant acted with the objectively reasonable be-
lief that the warrant was valid.
55
Justice White noted that the good faith exception would not apply
if the search warrant was based on an affidavit that was knowingly or
recklessly false, or was based on an affidavit that provided no substan-
tial basis for a finding of probable cause, or if the magistrate aban-
doned his neutral and detached function in issuing the warrant."
The Arkansas Supreme Court, in dicta, greeted the good faith ex-
ception with approval in several cases. In McFarland v. State,57 the
court held that a police officer's failure to return a warrant to the issu-
ing judicial officer was neither willful nor substantial and caused the
appellants no prejudice. Having held that the search was conducted
pursuant to a valid warrant and that the violation was not substantial,
the court nevertheless addressed Leon in dictum, noting that in light of
Leon and Sheppard, it had no difficulty in finding that the officer had
acted in good faith.
In Lincoln v. State,58 the court held evidence seized under a search
warrant admissible even though the affiant admitted that substantial
parts of the information given by an informant were false. According to
the court, the affidavit was sufficient without the false statements. Hav-
ing thus determined that the search was conducted pursuant to a valid
warrant, the court again noted that the officer had executed the war-
rant with a good faith belief that it was valid.
In Toland v. State,5 9 the court upheld admission of evidence seized
53. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3413.
54. Id. at 3421.
55. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. at 3429.
56. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3421-22.
57. 284 Ark. 533, 684 S.W.2d 233 (1985).
58. 285 Ark. 107, 685 S.W.2d 166 (1985).
59. 285 Ark. 415, 688 S.W.2d 718 (1985).
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pursuant to a warrant even though the directions given in the warrant
to the location to be searched were impossible to follow, and the in-
formant giving information was not even alleged to be reliable. Justice
Purtle, writing for the court, agreed with the trial court that the war-
rant was valid (and thus the evidence admissible) under the totality of
the circumstances test adopted in Thompson v. State.60 Justice Purtle
further noted that the evidence would be admissible under the good
faith exception rule of Leon and Sheppard, since the officer executing
the warrant knew the location to be searched and the items to be
seized.
State v. Anderson is the first Arkansas case in which application
of the rule in Leon would have been appropriate. Justice Hays, writing
for the court, addressed the challenge to the validity of the search war-
rant. He noted that Rule 13.1(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires either an affidavit or sworn, recorded testimony to
support the issuance of a warrant.
Having determined that the search had been conducted pursuant
to an invalid warrant, Justice Hays viewed the requirement of an affi-
davit or recorded testimony as a threshold requirement to be satisfied
before the question of the police officer's good faith could be consid-
ered. Without such a requirement, the defendant would have no record
upon which to base a challenge of the validity of a search warrant. The
defendant would thus be denied a basic procedural safeguard, one that
is independent of the requirement of probable cause for issuance of a
search warrant. 61 Justice Hays further stated that even if the relaxed
standards of Leon were applied, the search would still be unreasonable.
Police officers are charged with knowledge of the requirements of the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, and failure to provide either an
affidavit or recorded testimony could not be considered a good faith
error. 
2
No doubt the requirement of an affidavit or recorded testimony is
a substantial one. However, it is still a requirement that goes not to the
reasonableness of the search, but to the validity of the warrant. Other
warrantless searches provide no such procedural safeguards but are
deemed reasonable because of exceptional circumstances. 3 Admittedly,
without a written record it would be difficult to determine whether the
60. 280 Ark. 265, 658 S.W.2d 350 (1983) (adopting the totality of the circumstances test set
out in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)).
61. State v. Anderson, 286 Ark. at 62, 688 S.W.2d at 950.
62. Id. at 63, 688 S.W.2d at 950.
63. ARK. R. CRIM. P. art. IV.
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search was based on probable cause. Leon, however, does not require a
showing of probable cause. It requires only that the magistrate be de-
tached and neutral, that he be given sufficient truthful evidence to
make a determination of probable cause, and that the police officer
have an objective good faith belief that the warrant he executes is
valid.
64
Application of the good faith exception in Anderson would have
required a broad reading of Leon, something the court admitted it had
been unwilling to do in the past.6 5 However, the court could have pro-
vided guidance on whether Arkansas's exclusionary rule is based on
constitutional considerations, a deterrence rationale, or both. As it
turned out, Anderson offered little help to those wishing to predict the
future of the good faith exception in Arkansas courts.
Anderson shows that, after Leon, search and seizure issues in state
courts can no longer be decided on federal case law alone. The state
constitution and rules of criminal procedure, because they no longer
simply mirror federal case law, should and must be cited and inter-
preted before search and seizure issues can be decided. 6
Dale Scroggins
64. See Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422. Courts were left to their discretion to decide either the
good faith issue or the validity of the warrant, or both, depending upon the exigencies of the
particular case.
65. Anderson, 286 Ark. at 61-63, 688 S.W.2d at 949.
66. In Herrington v. State, 287 Ark. 228, 697 S.W.2d 899 (1985), decided after Anderson,
the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a search warrant was invalid because its supporting affida-
vit did not establish the time during which the criminal activity was observed. The court held that
this shortcoming could not be cured by a police officer's good faith, even in light of Leon and
Sheppard, because the affidavit's deficiency was apparent on its face. Issuance of a warrant based
on such an affidavit violated the Arkansas Constitution. Anderson was cited as an indication of the
court's unwillingness to read Leon and Sheppard broadly.
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